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Confidentiality or disclosure?
Professor Mark Pawlowski asks whether a beneficiary is
entitled to disclosure of the settlor’s wishes under a family
discretionary trust
Mark Pawlowski is a 
barrister and professor of
property law at the
University of Greenwich
WISH LETTERS
A
wish letter provides the means
by which a settlor may express
their preferences to the trustees
of a discretionary trust regarding the
exercise of the latter’s various discre-
tionary powers relating to distribution,
investment and administration of the
trust. In the context of distribution, in
particular, the settlor’s non-binding
wishes enable them to express freely
their own desires, expectations and
(even) prejudices about the beneficiaries
in an informal document that does not
form part of the trust deed and which,
therefore, may be kept secret in order to
avoid family disharmony and embar-
rassment.
This desire to maintain confidential-
ity, however, has the potential to conflict
with the legitimate desires of the benefi-
ciaries to have knowledge of the contents
of a wish letter so as to enable them to
have a better understanding of the terms
of the family settlement and to assess
their expectations of benefit in planning
for their future. This inevitable tension
between the respective advantages and
disadvantages of confidentiality and dis-
closure in relation to wish letters formed
the subject of the recent High Court
ruling of Briggs J in Breakspear v Ackland
[2008].
No duty to give reasons
It is trite law that a beneficiary, as a
matter of proprietary right, is entitled to
see all the trust documents: O’Rourke v
Darbishire [1920]. It is also well estab-
lished, however, that trustees who
exercise discretionary powers are not
obliged to disclose why they have exer-
cised their discretion in a particular way:
Re Beloved Wilke’s Charity [1851]. Indeed,
they may refuse to allow a beneficiary to
inspect documents, such as agendas and
minutes of their meetings, which will
reveal such information: Re Londonderry’s
Settlement [1965]. 
If, however, trustees volunteer rea-
sons for their discretionary decisions,
these may be the subject of judicial
scrutiny if they do not justify the
trustees’ conclusions. 
The rationale for protecting the
trustees’ deliberations on discretionary
matters from disclosure is twofold. First,
given their confidential role, trustees
would find it impossible to exercise their
discretion properly in the knowledge
that their decisions may be open to
investigation by the beneficiaries at any
time. Secondly, it would not be in the
best interests of the beneficiaries to make
such enquiries, since such action could
lead to embittered family feelings and
damage the relationship between the
trustees and members of the family.
Moreover, in the absence of any confi-
dentiality in such matters, individuals
would be reluctant to act as trustees in
family discretionary trusts. The princi-
ple of confidentiality, therefore, exists
just as much for the benefit of benefici-
aries as it does for the protection of the
trustees. The rationale, however, has
also been applied to the analogous situ-
ation of a trust of an employees’
contributory pension scheme in the
desire to minimise the potential for dis-
pute and litigation between various
groups of employees: Wilson v Law
Debenture Trust Corporation plc [1995].
A different approach
The question of whether a wish letter
falls within the scope of the confidential-
ity principle was considered in the
Australian case of Hartigan Nominees
Property Ltd v Rydge [1992]. The majority
of the Court of Appeal of New South
‘Since the settlor must 
be taken to have
relinquished all their
interest in the trust upon
its constitution, the
question of whether or
not to relax or abandon
confidentiality was a
matter exclusively for 
the trustees themselves,
or the court.’
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Wales held that the settlor’s letter
should not be disclosed to the benefici-
aries. According to Mahoney JA,
although the claim to disclosure was
based on a proprietary right vested in
the beneficiaries, this could not prevail
over the confidentiality that was inher-
ent in a discretionary family trust.
Sheller JA, on the other hand, preferred
to base his decision on the more narrow
ground that the settlor had (by implica-
tion) imposed on the trustees an
obligation to keep his wishes confiden-
tial from the beneficiaries, by which the
trustees were bound in the absence of
any countervailing circumstances. In his
view, wish letters did not fall within the
Londonderry class of documents that
would otherwise fall to be excluded
from disclosure to the beneficiaries.
According to Sheller JA, a wish letter
was no different from the trust deed
itself in so far as it did not, by itself
(unlike the agenda and minutes of the
trustees’ meetings), reveal the trustees’
motives and reasons for their decisions. 
A similar conclusion was reached by
Kirby P (in his dissent), when he con-
cluded that a wish letter was simply a
supplement to the trust deed and, hence,
a ‘trust document’ to which the benefici-
aries were entitled to have access. Such a
letter was ‘not created by the trustees’
and provided no ‘insight to the mind of
the trustees’ (as opposed to the settlor)
when making their decisions. More gen-
erally, Kirby P felt that there should be a
‘greater level of accountability’ by
trustees in relation to the administration
of a trust. This notion of greater trustee
accountability has been endorsed in
other Commonwealth jurisdictions,
notably New Zealand. In Foreman & ors v
Kingston & ors [2005] the High Court of
New Zealand concluded that it was the
fundamental duty of trustees to be
accountable to all beneficiaries. More-
over, that duty could not be overridden
by the settlor’s desire for confidentiality
unless there were ‘exceptional circum-
stances’ that outweighed ‘the right of the
beneficiaries to be informed’. 
A discretionary jurisdiction
The accountability approach was consid-
ered by the Jersey Royal Court in Re
Rabaiotti’s Settlement [2000]. Interestingly,
Kirby P’s conclusion in Hartigan that a
beneficiary should generally be entitled
to know the reasons for the trustees’
decisions was firmly rejected. In the
words of the Deputy Bailiff:
… the fact that the views and reasoning
of trustees on such sensitive matters
could be made available to any disaf-
fected beneficiary would, the Court
believes, inhibit full and free discussion,
and be likely to lead to ill-feeling and to
fruitless litigation.
In relation to wish letters, in particu-
lar, the Jersey Royal Court concluded
that these undoubtedly formed an inte-
gral part of the trustees’ consideration
of the exercise of their powers. As such,
it was closely related to the decision-
making process and to the reasons for
the decisions, and was not merely a doc-
ument which was ancillary to the trust
deed. There was a ‘strong presumption’,
therefore, that a letter of wishes did not
have to be disclosed to a beneficiary
against the wishes of the trustees unless
there were good grounds for doing so.
The upshot was that the court retained a
discretionary jurisdiction to order dis-
closure in appropriate cases. 
This conclusion was also reached in
Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003],
where the Privy Council held that the
true basis of a beneficiary’s claim to dis-
closure of material by trustees was not
proprietary in nature but merely an
aspect of the court’s inherent jurisdic-
tion to supervise and, if necessary,
intervene in the administration of a
trust. Thus, according to Lord Walker:
… no beneficiary (and least of all a dis-
cretionary object) has any entitlement as
of right to disclosure of anything which
can plausibly be described as a trust doc-
ument. Especially when there are issues
as to personal or commercial confiden-
tiality, the court may have to balance the
competing interests to different bene-
ficiaries, trustees themselves, and third
parties. Disclosure may have to be limited
and safeguards may have to be put in
place.
Disclosure, therefore, according to
the Privy Council, was ultimately a dis-
cretionary function for the court and not
a matter of proprietary right. 
Ruling in Breakspear
Not surprisingly, Briggs J has endorsed
the confidentiality principle enunciated
in Re Londonderry. He held that it was 
in the interests of the beneficiaries 
and advantageous to the administration
of family discretionary trusts that the 
exercise by trustees of their dispositive
discretionary powers should be re-
garded as essentially a confidential
process. Such confidentiality, however,
was subject to the court’s overriding
discretionary jurisdiction to order dis-
closure whenever appropriate. In his
words:
It seems to me axiomatic that a docu-
ment brought into existence for the sole
In the absence of any confidentiality in such matters,
individuals would be reluctant to act as trustees in
family discretionary trusts. The principle of
confidentiality, therefore, exists just as much for the
benefit of beneficiaries as it does for the protection
of the trustees.
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or predominant purpose of being used in
furtherance of an inherently confidential
process is itself properly to be regarded
as confidential, to substantially the same
extent and effect as the process which it
is intended to serve.
The fact, therefore, that a wish letter
formed a companion to the trust deed
itself did not preclude it from having
confidential status. The trust deed
merely identified the trustees’ powers
and so, logically, no confidentiality
attached to that document. A wish
letter, on the other hand:
… operated… purely in furtherance of the
trustees’ confidential exercise of discre-
tionary powers. 
Such a letter, therefore, was immune
from disclosure unless this was in the
interests of the sound administration of
the trust and the discharge of the
trustees’ powers and discretions.
Moreover, since the settlor must be
taken to have relinquished all their
interest in the trust upon its constitu-
tion, the question of whether or not to
relax or abandon confidentiality was a
matter exclusively for the trustees them-
selves, or the court. Interestingly, Briggs
J disagreed with the majority in
Hartigan on this point and suggested
that the express imposition of an obliga-
tion of confidence by the settlor was
irrelevant to determining the issue of
disclosure.
Practical guidance
Briggs J went to provide guidance to
trustees when confronted with the ques-
tion of disclosure at the request of a
beneficiary under a family discretionary
trust – this is set out in the box, right.
Decision
On the facts in Breakspear itself, Briggs J
was mindful, in the exercise of his 
discretion, to order disclosure of the
wish letter in favour of the beneficiary.
In this connection, the trustees argued
that disclosure would be divisive and
lead to family discord. Against this,
however, was the fact that the trustees
had intended, in due course, to seek 
the court’s approval for a future scheme
of distribution of the trust assets.
Inevitably, therefore, once the trustees
applied for such approval, the contents
of the settlor’s wish letter would
become relevant to the court’s appraisal
of the proposed scheme and, conse-
quently, the risk of family discord
occasioned by disclosure would be out-
weighed by the requirement to give the
beneficiaries a proper opportunity to
address the court on the merits of the
scheme. The trustees would then neces-
sarily have to surrender any form of
confidence protection, assuming full
disclosure and an examination of their
reasoning prompted by seeking the
court’s approval. 
Conclusion
It is apparent that the appropriate 
question (for both the trustees and the
court) is one of discretion. As Briggs J
was keen to emphasise, there are no
fixed rules and trustees should not
approach the question with any predis-
position towards either disclosure or
non-disclosure:
All relevant circumstances must be taken
into account, and in all cases other than
those limited to strict review of the neg-
ative exercise of a discretion, both the
trustees and the court have a range of
alternative responses, not limited to the
black and white question of disclosure or
non-disclosure.
Such alternative responses may
include the partial disclosure of relevant
documents (subject to obtaining appro-
priate undertakings to the court) and
limiting the use that may be made of
such documents. He also alluded to the
possibility of a private reading of a wish
letter by the judge as part of the process
of determining whether it should be
disclosed. ■
A mere refusal to disclose a wish letter by the
trustees, unaccompanied by any reasons or evidence
of bad faith or unfairness, will not ordinarily attract
court intervention. If the trustees do volunteer
reasons, these will be the subject of scrutiny by 
the court.
• Trustees should regard a wish letter as being inherently confidential.
• Trustees have a discretion, regardless of any request for disclosure made by the
beneficiaries, to maintain, relax or abandon confidentiality if they consider this best
serves the interests of the beneficiaries and the due administration of the trust.
• Where a beneficiary makes a request for disclosure, the trustees will need to exercise
their discretion giving such weight to the making of (and the reasons for) that request as
they think fit.
• The trustees are not obliged to give reasons for their decision.
• In a difficult case, the trustees may seek the directions of the court on the question of
whether to disclose, but must consider whether the difficulty of the question justifies the
cost of any such application.
• If an application is made to the court, full disclosure of the wish letter must be made to
the court. (The court will then consider whether, and to what extent, disclosure should
be made to the beneficiary for the purpose of the hearing.)
• If a beneficiary seeks to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, it will be necessary for them to
show that an occasion has arisen that calls for the court’s interference. (A mere refusal
to disclose a wish letter by the trustees, unaccompanied by any reasons or evidence of
bad faith or unfairness, will not ordinarily attract court intervention. If the trustees do
volunteer reasons, these will be the subject of scrutiny by the court.)
A duty to disclose?  The advice of Briggs J
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